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Stavridis: El Dorado Canyon: Reagan’s Undeclared War with Qaddafi,

repeats his arguments in successive
chapters is also somewhat irritating.
These criticisms notwithstanding, the
book provides an extremely interesting
and thought-provoking argument that is
cogently expressed in a well organized
work. Barnett has produced a useful
and positive contribution to the ongoing revitalization of the field of strategy
and to the associated debate surrounding the use of force in the international
environment. Students and professors
interested in security strategy in the
new century should add this work to
their libraries.
JAMES A. RUSSELL

Naval Postgraduate School

Stanik, Joseph T. El Dorado Canyon: Reagan’s Undeclared War with Qaddafi. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2002. 360pp. $34.95

This well researched and clearly written
study of U.S. combat with Libya in the
1980s has important echoes for today’s
policy makers. It begins with a quick
look at America’s first war with a Muslim state—in the nineteenth century,
when the U.S. Navy fought viciously
with the Barbary pirates off the coast of
North Africa. It then traces the rise of
one of the Barbary pirates’ direct
descendants—the well known latetwentieth-century practitioner of state
terrorism Muammar Qaddafi of
Libya. Throughout the book Joseph
Stanik, professor of history and retired
naval officer, provides detailed accounts
of the 1980 key attacks and a well reasoned analysis of their political impact.
There is, of course, particularly well
documented material covering the
key air strike of 15 April 1986, which
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was a devastating blow against
Qaddafi’s regime and changed his approach profoundly.
For those of us on active service in the
1980s, the battles with Libya seemed a
bit of a sideshow when compared to the
main dance of the Cold War. Yet this
relatively short, bitter conflict was actually a harbinger of things to come.
Much as today’s terrorists seek to influence global events through individual
attacks, Qaddafi sought to drive the
course of world activity through
bombings and state-sponsored terrorism. The Reagan administration at
first responded with rhetoric, but it
eventually became clear that more
forceful action would be needed.
It is interesting, in this time of “global
war on terrorism,” to look back to the
1980s and realize that this is a war that
began long before 9/11. President Reagan
was elected in no small measure in response to the state-condoned terrorism
of Iran, where radical students had held
American diplomats hostage for 444
days before Reagan’s election, releasing
them just after his inauguration. Over
the next five years, a series of dramatic
terrorist incidents followed—bombings
and killings in Lebanon, including the
horrific truck-bomb attack on the U.S.
Marine barracks in Beirut, killing over
two hundred Marines in a single moment; the murder of Marine embassy
guards in El Salvador; the hijacking of
major airliners and the killing of hostages, including a U.S. Navy SEAL,
Robert Stethem; airport killings in Rome
and Vienna; and the dramatic disco
bombing in Berlin. Clearly, the United
States had to respond, so in the spring
of 1986, Operation EL DORADO CANYON
sent a clear and dramatic message to
Muammar Qaddafi, with telling results.
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Beginning in the 1970s with territorial
claims that the Gulf of Sidra was actually within Libyan internal waters,
Qaddafi had plotted a collision course
with the United States. For over two decades he attempted to use Libya’s oil
wealth to undermine moderate governments in the Middle East and Africa,
sought weapons of mass destruction,
and developed a national foreign policy
that incorporated the use of terrorism
to achieve his objectives.
This is a story painted on a global canvas, from the 1986 La Belle Disco
bombing in West Berlin, which killed
U.S. servicemen, to the ghastly destruction of a global war on terrorism.
El Dorado Canyon is a fine case study in
combating terrorism and deserves a
place on the shelf of anyone interested
in America’s current conflict, as well as
the history of U.S. Navy involvement
in combat.
JAMES STAVRIDIS

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy

Friedman, Norman. Seapower and Space: From
the Dawn of the Missile Age to Net-centric Warfare.
Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2000.
384pp. $36.95

This work examines the development of
space systems and its implications for
naval warfare in the twenty-first century
by focusing on the argument that “access
to space systems makes possible a new
style of warfare.” It addresses the “linked
revolution of long-range missiles and
their space-based supporting systems.”
Furthermore, Friedman seeks to understand how the development of spacebased systems (notably rockets and
satellites) has radically influenced how
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naval forces conduct navigation,
communication, reconnaissance, and
targeting. The reality is that modern
military forces depend almost entirely
on platforms in space to know where
they are and to communicate with
friendly forces, as well as to know the
location of enemy forces and use that
information to destroy them. This “revolution in military affairs” is now having an effect on a global scale.
None of these observations, however, is
particularly new, and in fact all have
been widely discussed within the defense establishment since the Persian
Gulf War, when it became evident that
U.S. military forces depend to a unique
and unparalleled degree on constellations of satellites. Such technologies as
the Global Positioning System (GPS)
became familiar in the public debate
about national security in the early 1990s
with reports that U.S. soldiers used commercially purchased GPS receivers to
navigate across Iraq’s featureless desert.
In addition, the images broadcast globally of Scud missiles landing in Saudi
Arabia and Israel reinforced the reliance on space-based systems to warn of
impending attacks. Nor have we forgotten the failure of coalition forces
during the Persian Gulf War to find
Iraqi Scud missiles in what were called
“Scud hunts.”
What is interesting and noteworthy
about Friedman’s work is its focus on
the fact that the development of these
space systems has profound implications
for the nature and conduct of maritime
operations. In 2004, naval forces can
know exactly where they are in the middle of vast oceans; communicate with
their counterparts anywhere on the
globe; scan entire oceans or land masses
for targets in relatively short order;
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